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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to a parcel of property 
located in Park City, Utah, in which the Supreme Court, after 
an appeal, ordered the plaintiff's complaint dismissed with 
prejudice and held that the deed, which conveyed the property 
here involved from Summit County to the defendants Butkovich, 
was valid. Following the appeal the defendants Butkovich filed 
a motion in the lower court requesting an order dismissing the 
plaintiff's complaint and quieting title to the property in the 
Butkoviches. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the hearing on the defendants1 motion, Summit County, 
though not a party to this action, appeared in court to inform 
the court that it desired to claim title to the property here 
involved. The lower court ordered the defendants to join Summit 
County as a third-party defendant. After the joinder and the 
filing of a counterclaim by Summit County, the defendants filed 
a motion for summary judgment. The lower court granted the 
motion for summary judgment and entered a decree quieting title 
to the property in the defendants Butkovich. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party defendant-appellant, Summit County, seeks 
a reversal of the decree entered by the lower court. Respondents, 
the Butkoviches, seek to have the lower court's decree affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant's statement of facts is laced with many 
allegations which do not appear in the record, with some facts 
which are irrelevant to this appeal, with argument and innuendo 
and, therefore, respondents will present their own statement of 
facts. 
The defendants-respondents Butkovich obtained their title to 
the property by two quit claim deeds from Summit County on July 9, 
1964, and April 15, 1965. Summit County had previously, in 1915 
and 1940, obtained title by Auditor's Tax Deeds resulting from 
tax sales in 1910 and 1935. The second deed from the County was 
given to correct a slight error in the description on the first 
deed (R.62). 
Mr. Butkovich took a bulldozer on the property and blocked 
off entrances, drove in stakes and tied ribbons on trees to mark 
the boundaries, and put up "no trespassing" signs. He also cleared 
brush off the ground and leased the property to United Park City 
Mines Company for use as a ski run (R.62-63, Exh.20). 
The plaintiff, Colman, received a deed to the property in 1968 
from a Robert T. Banks. However, there was no conveyance of any 
kind to Banks. Upon learning of the claim to Butkoviches to the 
property, Colman filed this action praying for a decree quieting 
title in him. Following a trial and an appeal the Supreme Court 
ordered Colmanfs complaint dismissed with prejudice and held that 
the deed, which conveyed the property here involved from Summit 
County to Butkoviches, was valid. The Supreme Court's decision 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was based upon the lack of any chain of title to Colman and on 
the established validity of the conveyance to Butkoviches. 
A more complete statement of facts and the entire chain of 
title leading up to the conveyances to both Colman and Butkoviches 
is contained in Appellantsf Brief filed in the prior appeal of 
this case, Case No. 13868, and in the court's opinion therein, 
appearing in Colman v. Butkovich, Utah 2d , 538 P. 2d 
188 (1975). 
Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the Butkoviches 
filed a motion in the lower court requesting an order dismissing 
the plaintiff's complaint and quieting title to the property in 
the Butkoviches. At the hearing on this motion Summit County, 
though not a party to this action, appeared in court to inform the 
court that it desired to claim title to the property. The lower 
court thereupon ordered Butkoviches to join Summit County as a 
third-party defendant in order that it might assert its claim to 
the property. Summit County was joined and filed a counterclaim 
asserting that it had superior title to the property and that the 
title of the Butkoviches was void (R.248,232). 
Butkoviches then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming 
1) estoppel by deed, 2) equitable estoppel, 3) Summit County 
conveyed its entire title to Butkoviches, since the conveyances 
to and from Summit County used the same description, and 4) any 
title acquired by Summit County inures to the benefit of its 
grantees, the Butkoviches (R.243). There was no dispute of any 
facts relating to these claims and, therefore, the lower court 
granted the motion for summary judgment. 
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The appellant's statement of facts is disputed in the 
following respects: 
1) The statement, on page 2, as to the auditor's certification 
on the assessment rolls is not supported anywhere in the record. 
2) The deed descriptions on pages 2 and 3 are not complete 
since they leave out the location as being in Summit County and 
the reference to the sale for delinquent taxes against the prior 
owners, D. C. McLaughlin Estate and Park City Townsite, which 
refers to only one possible tract of land. 
3) The reference on page 3 to other transactions and prior 
negotiations with Summit County are irrelevant and accuse 
Mr. Butkovich of dishonesty with no basis in fact. 
4) The references on page 3 to the deeds to and from Secutiy 
Title Company are irrelevant and do not accurately state where the 
description on those deeds came from. 
5) The conversation quoted on page 4 does not establish 
Summit County's claim that Mr. Butkovich included all unclaimed land 
in the general vicinity--nor does anything in the record. 
6) The statement on page 4 that the surveyor testified he 
could not locate the property described on the deed to Butkoviches 
is false. He testified that he could locate it (R.33-34) as did 
an abstractor and attorney who also testified (R.90-91,95-96). 
7) The statements on page 5 that the Supreme Court rejected 
Butkoviches1 claim of title to the property is false. This court 
specifically stated at 538 P. 2d 190: 
"The trial court, for some reason, emphasized what 
we think was an unwarranted conclusion that defendants1 
(Butkoviches) document of transfer from Summit County, 
namely, the County Deed, had a vague description. 
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Expert testimony was to the effect that the 
description closed at a border line of Park 
City Townsite, by a well-known and commonly 
used abbreviation of MP.C." to describe the 
townsite situate in Summit County." 
This court also said in its opinion that "Summit County obtained 
unquestioned title to the property for nonpayment of taxes, and 
sold it . . . to Butkovich in 1964." The references to Summit 
County as the owner related only to the time prior to the sale 
to the Butkoviches. 
ARGUMENT 
Since Summit County inserted itself into this lawsuit and 
attempted to challenge the title of the Butkoviches, this Court 
must first consider the question of whether Summit County has any 
right to challenge that title. This argument will, therefore, first 
consider that question and show why Summit County is barred from 
making a claim because of estoppel by deed, equitable estoppel, and 
because Summit County conveyed everything it had to Butkoviches and 
any after-acquired right of Summit County inures to the benefit of 
the Butkoviches. Thereafter, the points raised in appellant's 
brief will be countered. 
_^_ 
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POINT I 
SUMMIT COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
TITLE OF THE BUTKOVICHES. 
A. SUMMIT COUNTY, AS THE GRANTOR 
IN THE DEED TO THE BUTKOVICHES, 
IS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING ITS 
OWN DEED AND DENYING THE TITLE 
OF ITS GRANTEES. 
Summit County conveyed the property here involved to the 
Butkoviches in 1964 by quit claim deed. In doing so Summit County 
transferred any interest it held in that property to the Butkoviches. 
If there is anything about that conveyance which is improper, it 
is not the right of Summit County to challenge it. This principle 
of estoppel by deed is well-established in the law and provides 
that a grantor is "estopped from denying the title of his grantee 
or his own authority to sell or convey/1 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel 
and Waiver, §10. This principle operates even if the deed itself 
is invalid as is claimed by the appellant here. In Daniell v. 
Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1410 (Fla. 1950), the court 
held at 23 A.L.R. 2d 1417 that "regardless of the invalidity of 
the tax deeds, and the untruth of their recitals, the State of 
Florida, the grantor therein, is estopped to question the validity 
of such deeds and the truth of their recitals." In that case the 
tax deeds from the State of Florida were invalid because title 
to the property was held by the United States at the time of the 
tax assessment and sale by the State. The court stated, at 23 A.L.R. 
2d 1416, "the United States, or any purchaser from the United States 
other than the State of Florida would be entitled to challenge the 
validity of the tax deeds . . . ." This principle is established 
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in numerous cases, many of which are discussed in the annotation, 
Estoppel of United States, state or political subdivision by deed 
or other instrument, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1419. 
The purpose of this principle of the law becomes obvious 
when considered in light of this case now before the court. Summit 
County has not challenged anything about its sale of this property 
to the Butkoviches. There is no question raised about fraud, 
misrepresentation, or unfairness of the price. Summit County is 
now attempting to challenge its own deed only because it wants the 
property back, undoubtedly, because of an increase in value in 
recent years. It would be grossly unfair to allow such a challenge 
and the principal of estoppel by deed exists to prevent it. 
B. SUMMIT COUNTY IS BARRED BY EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL FROM CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF 
THE BUTKOVICHES BECAUSE OF ITS LEVY, 
ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAXES FOR 
ELEVEN YEARS AND BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE 
TO REFUND OR OFFER TO REFUND THE TAXES 
COLLECTED ON THE PROPERTY. 
After conveyance of this property to the Butkoviches in 1964 
Summit County assessed and collected taxes thereon each year there-
after. Its present rash attempt to retake the property is barred 
by the principle of equitable estoppel. A party who comes into 
a court of equity to quiet title to property is bound by the maxim, 
"He who seeks equity must do equity." That this principle also 
applies to governmental entities is also established by Daniell v. 
Sherrill, supra, at 1416-17. There also the state acquiesced in 
the possession and improvement of the property, collected taxes 
on the property over many years, and failed to refund or offer to 
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refund the taxes collected. The court stated at page 1417, 
MWe further hold, in addition to the technical or legal estoppel, 
that the facts in this case raise an equitable estoppel against 
the State." 
Summit County's failure to do equity in this case, after its 
acquiescence in possession and collection of taxes over many years, 
raises an equitable estoppel against the County. There is no reason 
why the County should not be held to the same standards required of 
its citizens. 
C. SUMMIT COUNTY IS BARRED FROM 
CHALLENGING THE TITLE OF BUTKOVICHES 
BECAUSE IT RETAINS NO INTEREST IN 
THE PROPERTY, HAVING CONVEYED EVERY-
THING IT OWNED TO THE BUTKOVICHES. 
The title to the property involved in this case was obtained 
initially by Summit County by auditor's tax deeds. The property 
had previously been assessed with taxes and upon nonpayment by the 
owners, tax sales resulted and the property was conveyed to Summit 
County in the annual flMayM sales. The history of these assessments 
and tax sales appears in the abstract of title in evidence (Exh.ll) 
and in the summaries of the chain of title also in evidence (Exh.llA 
and 11B). The important thing to note is that the legal description 
on the deeds from Summit County to the Butkoviches is precisely 
the same as the legal description used on the assessment notices, 
tax notices and auditor's tax deeds to the County. Therefore, the 
question of the vagueness or validity of the legal description on 
the deed to the Butkoviches does not benefit the County at all. 
If the description on the deed to Butkovich is vague rendering the 
deed void, then the description on the auditor's deed to the County Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is vague, rendering it void, since the descriptions on both were 
precisely the same. If the auditor's deed to the County is valid, 
then the deed to the Butkoviches is valid, giving the Butkoviches 
title to the property, again because the descriptions on both deeds 
were precisely the same. Since the County has conveyed all the 
interest it received in this property, whatever that interest might 
be, it retains no title to this property and has no right to 
challenge the title of the Butkoviches. 
D. ANY INTEREST ACQUIRED BY SUMMIT COUNTY, 
AFTER ITS DEED TO THE BUTKOVICHES, INURES 
TO THE BENEFIT OF THE BUTKOVICHES. 
Summit County has argued in its brief that the decision of 
this Court in Colman v. Butkovich, supra, in some mysterious way, 
held that title to this property is in Summit County, even though 
Summit County was not a party to that action. It is true that there 
are two references in that opinion to Summit County as the owner 
of the property. In both instances, however, the reference is to 
the title held by Summit County after the tax deeds to the County, 
resulting from failure to pay taxes, and prior to the conveyance 
of title by the County to the Butkoviches in 1964. Of course, the 
County had title then and, as this court stated at 538 P. 2d 189, 
it was "unquestioned title". There is no holding anywhere in that 
opinion that Summit County now holds title. 
However, should Summit County obtain any title to that property 
after its deed to the Butkoviches, whether by reason of this court's 
decision or by any other means, that title inures to the Butkoviches. 
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This principle of after-acquired title is also well established 
in the law. It is stated in 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, §294 as 
follows: 
"A grantor who executes a deed purporting to 
convey land to which he has no title or to 
which he has a defective title at the time of 
the conveyance will not be permitted, when he 
afterward acquires a good title to the land, 
to claim in opposition to his deed as against 
the grantee or any person claiming title under 
him. This rule is applicable even though the 
deed was by way of gift." 
This principle also applies to governmental entities as is 
again shown by Daniel! v. Sherrill, supra, at 1418. 
POINT II 
THE FILING OF AN UNDERTAKING REQUIRED BY SECTION 
63-30-19, U.C.A., DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE AND 
THE REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED BY SUMMIT COUNTY SINCE 
IT WAS NOT ASSERTED IN ITS ANSWER. 
Summit County, in Point I of its brief, has taken what seems 
to be a ludicrous position. The County appeared in court, while 
not a party to this action, and without notice or invitation, and 
literally demanded to be made a party so it could assert a claim 
to the property involved in the action. The court complied and 
ordered the Butkoviches to join the County as third-party defendants. 
Now the County suggests that the third-party complaint should have 
been dismissed because no undertaking was filed as required by 
Section 63-30-19, U.C.A. How is the County to assert its claim 
if the third-party complaint is dismissed? The Butkoviches would 
have preferred to leave the County out of the suit but joined 
the County at its request as ordered by the court. That order of 
the court was questionable and could undoubtedly have been successful 
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challenged on appeal. If the County wanted to assert an interest 
in the property, why shouldn't it file its own complaint or file 
a complaint in intervention in this action? In fact the Butkoviches 
would have no objection at all to a dismissal of the County since 
they had no reason to join the party from whom they obtained their 
deed, for the reasons set forth in Point I of this brief. It is 
obvious that under these conditions, Section 63-30-19, U.C.A., does 
not apply. 
However, the County waived any right it had to invoke Section 
63-30-19, U.C.A., because it failed to assert that defense in its 
answer which was filed long before its belated and untimely Motion 
to Dismiss, which asserted that section as an afterthought. 
Section 63-30-16, U.C.A., also a part of the act requiring the 
filing of an undertaking, provides that actions brought under the 
Act shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(" 
of those Rules provides: 
MA party waives all defenses and objections 
which he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply, except . . . ." 
(Certain defenses not applicable here). 
Rule 12 obviously calls for the filing of a motion prior to 
the filing of an answer and if a defense, other than those excepted 
in the rule, is not asserted in that prior motion or in the later 
answer, it is waived. Summit County has therefore waived its 
claimed defense. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DISPUTE AS TO ANY 
MATERIAL FACT. 
In Point II of its brief Summit County has argued that the 
motion for summary judgment was granted in error. However, no 
reference is made to any material fact about which an issue exists. 
Rather the argument claims only that the lower court, in a previous 
trial, while Summit County was not a party, held that the deed to 
the Butkoviches was void and that the Supreme Court held that the 
County held title. The County has completely ignored the fact that 
this court reversed the decision of the lower court with respect 
to the validity of the deed to the Butkoviches. The decision of 
the Supreme Court was very specific on that point when it stated, 
at 538 P. 2d 190: 
"The trial court, for some reason, emphasized 
what we think was an unwarranted conclusion 
that defendants' (Butkovich) document of 
transfer from Summit County, namely, the County 
Deed, had a vague description. Expert testimony 
was to the effect that the description closed 
at a border line of Park City Townsite, by a 
well-known and commonly used abbreviation of 
"P.C." to describe the townsite situate in Summit 
County." 
This part of the opinion quite clearly overturns the 
"unwarranted" decision of the lower court and expressly upholds the 
validity of the deed to the Butkoviches. 
The County's claim that this court held that the County held 
title has been adequately refuted in Point 1(D) of this brief. 
Suffice it to say that the language in the opinion to the effect 
that Summit County had unquestioned title before its conveyance 
to the Butkoviches, does not give the County any claim to the property Digitized by the Howar  W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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now--some twelve years after its conveyance to the Butkoviches. 
The undisputed material facts in this case appear in the 
Findings of Fact as follows (R.253): 
"7. That whatever title to the property 
here involved may have been held by Summit 
County was conveyed to the defendants 
Butkovich by deeds from Summit County in 
1964 and 1965. 
"8. That since 1964 Summit County has assessed 
and collected taxes on the property here 
involved and has not refunded or offered to 
refund any of those taxes." 
These facts were already in evidence in this case and are 
not contested by the County. The only issues to be resolved were 
legal issues and for this purpose summary judgment is appropriate. 
The lower court, therefore, properly concluded that Summit County 
was estopped from challenging its own deeds, was equitably estopped 
from challenging the defendants1 title because of its failure to 
do equity, and had conveyed its entire rights to the property to 
Butkoviches and retained no rights therein. 
POINT IV 
THE VALIDITY OF BUTKOVICHES1 TAX TITLE IS NOT 
RELEVANT IN THIS PROCEEDING. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR 
TAX TITLE IS VALID AND THEIR PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
IS ADEQUATE. IF THEIR TITLE IS VOID, SO WAS THE 
COUNTY'S TITLE. 
Summit County's challenge to the validity of the title of 
the Butkoviches, in Point III of its brief, is irrelevant because 
of Summit County's lack of standing to challenge their title, as 
established in Point I of this brief. Furthermore, Summit County 
is barred by the statutes of limitations in §§78-12-5.1 and 5.2, 
U.C.A., which bar any action or defense against the holder of a 
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tax title unless the party bringing the action or asserting the 
defense has had possession of the property within four years of 
such action. Summit County has not had any possession of this 
property and makes no claim to it--at any point in time. This 
challenge by the County should, therefore, not even be entertained 
by the court. 
Furthermore, the County's claim that the description is void, 
if true, would invalidate its own title. As set forth in Point 1(C) 
above, the description on its assessment notices and the auditor's 
tax deed to the County was exactly the same as that on its deed to 
Butkoviches. If one is void for vagueness, so is the other. The 
County is, therefore, attempting to invalidate the title it had 
but has since conveyed. 
As to the claim that the deed to Butkoviches is void, the 
County only rehashes the assertions of the plaintiff Colman in the 
prior appeal of this case. Nothing new appears in this appeal and 
the County's argument should be adequately disposed of by Point II 
of Appellants' Reply Brief on the prior appeal. Without repeating 
the argument appearing there, the following points should be 
considered. 
The case of Burton v. Hoover, 93 Utah 498, 74 P. 2d 652 (1937), 
relied on by the County on this point, held that the failure to 
designate the township and range in the legal description resulted 
in a defective title. That case has been limited, however, by 
the later case of Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318 
(1943), which considered the failure to designate the township 
"North" and the Range "West" not fatal where the location in Box 
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Elder County must of necessity be "North" and "West11. The court 
took judicial notice of such facts. 
The County also relies on Howard v. Howard, 12 U. 2d 407, 
367 P. 2d 193 (1962), in which a metes and bounds description in 
a deed was missing the last two courses and the acreage, if the 
missing courses were implied, was only half what the deed stated 
it to be. There were numerous other confusing defects in the deed 
and the court held it void because it was impossible to determine 
what the grantor intended. The court stated, however, that "the 
grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably determinable, 
The facts in that case have nothing in common with those here. 
The County further relies on the old California case of 
Scott v. Woodworth, 34 C.A. 400, 167 Pac. 543 (1917), which held 
a description too vague where no westerly boundary was given, nothing 
was stated from which it could be inferred, the described southerly 
boundary did not exist and the described north and east boundaries 
were actually on the west. The court further held that the 
document involved was not, and was not intended to be, a deed. Again 
the facts in that case having nothing in common with those here. 
The suggestion made by the County that the description in the 
Butkovich deed does not close and has no westerly boundary is simply 
not true. Quoting from pages 11-12 of Appellants1 Reply Brief on 
the prior appeal of this case: 
"The description here, property in Summit 
County, Utah, to wit: "all unplatted land in 
this Block (29 P.C.) and all land West of this 
Blk." with reference to the sale for delinquent 
taxes against the prior owners, D. C. McLaughlin 
Estate and Park City Townsite, refers to only 
one possible tract of land. The designation 
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MP.C.M is a standard, well-known 
abbreviation for property in the Park City 
Townsite in Summit County (Tr. 90-91), and 
such abbreviations Mhaving local significance11 
are authorized by §59-11-6, U.C.A. This 
property description does not run West Mto 
the Pacific Ocean, to the West line of Utah, 
Summit County or to the summit of the next 
mountain" as Colman so facetiously suggests 
[as Summit County also suggests, also 
facetiously]. It obviously runs to the West 
boundary of the Park City Townsite. There is 
only one Block 29 in the Park City Townsite 
and only one Park City Townsite in Summit 
County, Utah. Ownership in all the property 
West of the Park City Townsite was in the 
United States Government and was therefore not 
assessed (Tr. 88-90). There were no surrounding 
landowners to be confused by this description. 
It could not apply to any other land. Ferguson 
v Ma this, 96 Utah 442, 85 P. 2d 827 (1938); 
relied upon by Colman, held the description of 
the property involved to be sufficient and not 
misleading and relied upon testimony of numerous 
witnesses that the alleged faults in the descrip-
tion were common parlance and that there was no 
other land in the County to which this descrip-
tion would apply. This is also true here.11.. 
If this argument is not sufficient to establish the point, 
then the stare decisis or res judicata effect of this court's 
decision on the prior appeal in this case should dispose of the 
matter. Again, this court held that the lower court's conclusion, 
that the description was vague, was ''unwarranted" and pointed out 
that "expert testimony was to the effect that the description closed 
at a border line of Park City Townsite, by a well-known and commonly 
used abbreviation of 'P.C.' to describe the townsite situate in 
Summit County." It should be noted that the County's brief quotes 
testimony and facts from the transcript in the prior appeal of this 
case, all of which was before this court then. No new facts are 
present here, nor could any be introduced, to warrant any different 
conclusion than was reached there. i 
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POINT V 
WHETHER OR NOT THE AUDITOR'S AFFIDAVITS WERE 
ATTACHED TO THE ASSESSMENT ROLL IS NOT RELEVANT 
HERE. FURTHERMORE, THAT ALLEGED FACT NOWHERE 
APPEARS IN THE RECORD, WAS NOT BROUGHT BEFORE 
THE LOWER COURT AND CANNOT BE BROUGHT BEFORE 
THIS COURT. 
The County has made the unsupported assertion in its brief 
that the auditor's affidavit was not attached to the assessment 
roll with respect to the property here involved. This is the first 
time in this case that this assertion has been made. It was not 
brought to the attention of the lower court. It appears nowhere 
in the record of this case. The law and practice of this court 
prevent a party from making such a claim for the first time on 
appeal, especially where there are no facts in the record to support 
the claim. First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, U. 2d 
, 544 P. 2d 887 (1975); Davis v. Mulholland, 25 U. 2d 56, 475 P. 
2d 834 (1970). 
Furthermore, the claim is irrelevant where the County has 
failed to establish its standing to challenge the validity of the 
Butkoviches title, as set forth in Point I of this brief, and where 
the County is barred by the statutes of limitations, as set forth 
in the first part of Point IV of this brief. And to be repetitious, 
if the deed to Butkoviches is void for lack of the auditor's 
affidavit, the County's assessments, auditor's deed and title are als 
void. The County gains nothing by this irrelevant argument. 
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CONCLUSION 
This brazen attempt by Summit County to retake the 
property it sold to the Butkoviches, after having conveyed its 
entire interest to them and having collected the purchase price 
as well as taxes assessed thereon from them over many years, 
should be rejected by this court, as it was by the lower court. 
The County has not shown, nor even alleged, any impropriety on 
the part of the Butkoviches. It seeks merely to claim for itself 
the increased value of this property caused by inflation and 
surrounding development in recent years. 
Summit County has no right to challenge the title of 
the Butkoviches because 1) it is estopped from challenging its 
own deed, 2) it is estopped from seeking an equitable decree 
quieting title when it has failed to do equity in offering to refund 
the purchase price and all taxes paid, (3) it has conveyed the 
entire interest in this property to the Butkoviches and retains 
no title at all, and 4) any interest it retained or has since 
obtained, inures to the benefit of its grantees. As to the 
County's arguments: 1) The statutory requirement of an undertaking 
doesn't apply to this case where the County is, in effect, the 
uninvited intervening party and has waived its right to assert 
that defense by failure to include that defense in its answer. 
2) Summary judgment was entirely proper since all of the facts were 
in evidence, no material facts were in dispute and the Butkoviches 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3) The validity 
of the Butkoviches1 title is irrelevant in this proceeding but if 
it was void, the County's title was likewise void. Howrever, the 
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tax title description was adequate because it could apply to 
only one piece of property and no one was confused or misled by 
that description, least of all the County who assessed the property 
by that description. 4) The alleged failure of the auditor to 
attach his affidavit to the assessment roll appears nowhere in 
the record, is irrelevant, was not brought before the lower court 
and canft be raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the 
summary judgment entered by the lower court was the only proper 
decision that could have been made and should be affirmed by this 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK 6c MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorney for Respondents 
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